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Abstract.  Using  a  unique  farm-level  panel  data  set  derived  from  three  U.S.  Agricultural 
Censuses,  we  estimate  a  Cox  proportional  hazard  model  to  examine  the  effect  of  direct 
government  payments  on  the  survival  of  farm  businesses,  paying  particular  attention  to  the 
differential effect of payments across farm size categories. For identification the study exploits 
variation in payments resulting from historical differences in ‘base acreage’ in otherwise similar 
farms.  We  find  an  increase  in  government  payments  has  a  small but  statistically  significant 
positive effect on the rate of farm survival, and the magnitude of this effect increases with farm 
size.  (L10, Q12, Q18) 
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Abstract.  Using  a  unique  farm-level  panel  data  set  derived  from  three  U.S.  Agricultural 
Censuses,  we  estimate  a  Cox  proportional  hazard  model  to  examine  the  effect  of  direct 
government  payments  on  the  survival  of  farm  businesses,  paying  particular  attention  to  the 
differential effect of payments across farm size categories. For identification the study exploits 
variation in payments resulting from historical differences in ‘base acreage’ in otherwise similar 
farms.  We  find  an  increase  in  government  payments  has  a  small but  statistically  significant 
negative effect on the rate of business failure, and the magnitude of this effect increases with 
farm size.  (L10, Q12, Q18) 
 
I. Introduction 
Economists and policymakers have long been interested in the role of government payments in 
the growth and survival of farm businesses (e.g., Shepard, 1982; Leathers, 1992; Tweeten, 1993; 
Atwood, Watts, and Baquet, 1996; Huffman and Evenson, 2001). With government payments to 
farmers exceeding $20 billion in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003 – the role of farm payments has 
received greater public scrutiny, with some maintaining that the subsidies unfairly advantage 
large operations (e.g., Williams-Derry and Cook, 2000; Becker, 2001). These concerns spurred 
congressional efforts to tighten payment caps on large-scale producers during the 2002 Farm Act 
debate  (e.g.  Nelson,  2002).    The  effect  of  payments  on  farm  survival  continues  to  be  an 
important  issue  in  on-going  international  trade  negotiations,  where  distortions  created  by 
agricultural support programs are a major source of contention. 
This study uses a unique limited-access farm-level panel data set created from the 1987, 
1992, and 1997 Censuses of Agriculture to derive the first estimates of the effect of government 
payments on the survival of individual U.S. farm businesses. Specifically, we estimate a Cox   3 
proportional hazards model to examine the effect of government payments on the instantaneous 
probability  (hazard  rate)  of  a  farm  business  failure.  The  data  allow  us  to  examine  how 
government payments influence the survival of individual businesses, controlling for the size, 
location  and  organizational  structure  of  the  operation,  and  the  age,  race,  sex,  and  career 
specialization  of  the  operator.    We  derive  separate  estimates  of  the  effect  of  payments  on 
business survival for six farm-size categories. 
This  study  exploits  an  exogenous  source  of  variation  in  government  payments  – 
differences in payments that result from differences in ‘base acreage’ in otherwise similar farms.  
Farmers that operate the same amount of land, located in the same county, producing the same 
crop may receive different levels of government payments if they have different amounts of land 
enrolled  as  ‘base  acres’  –  land  enrolled  in  a  particular  commodity  program  based  on  past 
plantings.  Prior to 1996, restrictions on what could be planted on base acreage elicited less than 
full participation in government programs – between 60 to 85 percent of qualified acres for most 
crops (USDA-ERS). Due to historical variation in participation, similar farms had different base 
acres and received different amounts of government payments.  
We  find  that  government  payments  have  a  small  but  statistically  significant  negative 
effect on the instantaneous farm business failure rate.  We also find that government payments 
reduce the failure rate  proportionally more for larger farms.  These results suggest that past 
agricultural  support  payments  have  contributed  disproportionately  to  the  survival  of  large 
operations. 
   4 
II. Literature 
There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature relating to firm size and firm survival.  
Jovanovic (1982), Ericson and Pakes (1992) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) present models in 
which firms (or entrepreneurs) are uncertain about their own efficiencies at startup.  In these 
models, firms gradually learn about their abilities over time.   The longer a firm operates in the 
market,  the  more  information  is  gained.    Firms  who  revise  their  perceptions  of  their  ability 
upward  over  time  tend  to  expand,  while  those  revising  downward  tend  to  contract  or  exit.   
Consequently, the longer a firm has existed, the bigger it will be and the less likely it will be to 
fail.  Empirical  studies  generally  confirm  these  theoretical  predictions  (Dunne,  Roberts  and 
Samuelson,  1988;  Baldwin  and  Gorecki,  1991;  Audretsch,  1992;  Audretsch  and  Mahmood, 
1995; among others).   
For  small  businesses,  the  personal  characteristics  of  the  owner,  such  as  educational 
attainment,  can  be  important  for  small  business  survival  (Bates,  1990;  Taylor,  1999).    The 
operator’s age may be another important determinant of firm size and survival. Age may be 
correlated  to  knowledge  about  the  firm’s  competitive  abilities  –  with  older  owners  able  to 
acquire more information (Jovanovic, 1982).  Alternatively, the operator’s age may be related to 
financial liquidity.  In the presence of liquidity constraints, it may take many years for business 
owners to accumulate sufficient net worth to obtain a certain scale of production (Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994).  
Government  payments  could  influence  farm  business  survival  through  a  variety  of 
mechanisms. Farms receiving high payments per-acre could bid up prices of fixed resources – 
especially land – causing low payment-per-acre farms to shrink or exit.  Payments could also 
influence farm survival through capital market mechanisms. Government payments effectively   5 
raise a farm’s net worth. This could make it less costly for the farm to obtain financing when 
liquidity constraints cause a farm’s cost of capital to depend on its net worth (Hubbard, 1998).  If 
large farms are liquidity constrained and small farms are not then an increase in payments per 
acre can cause large farms to expand and increase in number, which bids up land prices causing 
small farms to shrink and decline in number (Key and Roberts, 2005). Higher payments may also 
make  agriculture  more  profitable  relative  to  alternative  occupations,  which  could  reduce  the 
incentive to exit farming. 
Although a limited number of econometric studies have attempted to explain changes in 
the size and survival of farms based on characteristics of the farm operator or farm (Sumner and 
Leiby, 1987; Hallam, 1993; Zepeda, 1995; Weiss, 1999; Kimhi and Bollman, 1999), none have 
considered the role of government payments.  A few studies have examined the relationship over 
time between government payments and aggregate measures of farm structure, including the 
national agricultural bankruptcy rate (Shepard and Collins, 1982), the total number of farms 
(Tweeten, 1993), and average farm size (Huffman and Evenson, 2001).  To our knowledge, this 




The data used in this study are from the Census of Agriculture files maintained by the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service.
1  The Census is conducted every five years and includes all U.S. 
farms.  Since we are interested in the effect of government payments on farm survival, and to 
reduce sample heterogeneity, we restrict our analysis to “program crop farms” – those operations 
                                                 
1 More information about the Census of Agriculture can be found at: http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/.   6 
with  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  codes  indicating  specialization  in  wheat,  corn, 
soybean, rice, cotton, or “cash grains”.
2  Farms with these six SIC codes receive the largest 
shares of government farm payments.   
Using the Census data, table 1 presents the survival rates of program crop farms that 
initiated production in 1982 by SIC code.
3  About 50% of new farms failed within the first five 
years.  After  10  years,  about  32%  of  farms  remained  in  business,  and  after  15  years  22.5% 
remained in business. These survival rates are comparable to what has been reported for non-
agricultural firms (e.g., Audretsch, 1991; Mata et al., 1995; Disney et al, 2003).  Consistent with 
past studies, the probability of survival generally  increases with the age of the firm (Evans, 
1987a; Evans, 1987b; Audretsch, 1991).  The survival rate does not vary considerably across 
farm types distinguished by their primary crop. 
Because of the way information in the Census of Agriculture is collected, we focus on the 
duration of a farm business continuously operated by the same individual. The Census collects 
information as to when the current operator began to operate the farm, but not about how long 
the farm has been operating.  Hence, there is no way to estimate the life of a farm business unless 
the same operator manages it.
4  Consequently, we define a surviving farm as one remaining in 
                                                 
2 The three-digit SIC codes for wheat, corn, soybean, or rice are assigned if any one of these crops account for at 
least 50% of sales. An operation is classified as a “cash grain” farm if a combination of these crops, or another cash 
grain not elsewhere classified totals at least 50% of sales. 
3 More precisely the sample consists of farms that were first observed in the 1982 Census – these farms might have 
initiated production between 1979 and 1982, as 1978 was the year of the previous Census.  
4 The Census tracks operations over time using a Census File Number (CFN). The Census defines a farm as out of 
business if there is no response to the Census questionnaire or the questionnaire is returned stating that the farm is 
no longer operating.  However, if a farm changes operators through a business transaction or inheritance, the CFN 
may change even though the business is still operating.  Hence it is not possible to estimate the duration of a farm 
business based on how long the CFN appears in the Census.   7 
business and having the same operator; farms remaining in business with a different operator 
were removed from the sample.
5 
We examine the role of government payments in the survival of program crop farms that 
were in business in 1987 – the first year the Census of Agriculture began collecting information 
on government payments.  Our sample includes the 255,477 program crop farms that had at least 
10 acres of land and $1000 of sales in 1987 and for which information on all variables was 
available.  The Census allows us to identify whether a farm business ceased operating between 
1987 and 1992, or between 1992 and 1997, or whether it was still operating in 1997.  In addition, 
the  Census  records  the  year  in  which  the  current  operator  began  managing  the  operation.  
Therefore, the spell or life of the farm business is defined as 1987 minus the year the operator 
initiated farming on the operation plus 2.5, 7.5, or 10, depending on whether the operation failed 
by 1992, failed by 1997, or remained in business in 1997, respectively.  If the operation remained 
in business in 1997, the spell is right censored.   
Because of the way we define the age of the business, all spells are left truncated. We do 
not begin to observe businesses until 1987 - a known time after they began operating, and the 
risk set does not include businesses that failed prior to 1987.  For example, of all businesses 
initiated in 1980, we only observe those businesses in 1987 that survived at least seven years.  
We do not observe farms that failed before 1987.  Hence, for businesses that began in 1980 the 
spell is left truncated at seven years.  The observed spell is therefore conditional on the period of 
truncation being exceeded.
6  
                                                 
5 A farm is considered to have the same operator if the age of the operator differs by five years between consecutive 
Censuses. About 8% of continuing farms had operators whose age differed by more or less than five years, and were 
therefore eliminated from the sample.  
6 Left truncation is accounted for in the estimated likelihood function associated with the Cox proportional hazard 
model  and  the  product-limit  survival  function  estimates  discussed  in  the  next  section  (See  SAS  9.1  PHREG 
Procedure, p. 2998, for details).   8 
IV. Methods and Results 
First, we compare the average spell of farm businesses of different sizes and different shares of 
government payments in total sales.  Table 2 shows that for all sales quantiles examined, a larger 
share of government payments in sales corresponds to a longer average spell.
7  For example, for 
farms between the 75
th and 100
th sales percentile (more than $84,268 in sales), those in lowest 
payments share quartile have an average spell of 24.57 years compared to 28.19 years for those 
in the highest payments share quartile. 
Next,  we  compare  Kaplan-Meier  nonparametric  survivor  function  estimates  for  farm 
businesses with high and low government payments as a share of sales in 1987 (the first year of 
the study).  Figure 1 illustrates that farms in the bottom government-payments-as-a-share-of-
sales  quartile  (govpaycat=25)  are  less  likely  to  survive  than  are  those  in  the  top  quartile 
(govpaycat=75).  The Kaplan-Meier estimation does not account for the left truncation of the 
spells  mentioned  above,  so  the  estimated  survival  probabilities  are  biased.
8  However,  a 
comparison of the survival functions illustrates a clear difference between the groups. After 30 
years, only about 42% of farms in the bottom payments-share quartile survived compared to 
about 58% of farms in the top quartile.  Farms in the bottom payment-share quartile have an 
estimated mean life span of 27.4 years, compared to 34.5 years for farms in the top quartile.  
Statistical tests reveal that it is very unlikely that the survivor functions are identical across the 
government payment strata.  Both the Savage (log-rank) test and the Wilcoxon test indicate a 
                                                 
7 The average spells reported in table 2 do not account for left truncation or right censoring, meaning the average 
spells should not be interpreted as estimates of average life spans. 
8 Survival probability estimates are biased upward as short-lived businesses are disproportionately excluded from 
the sample.   9 
significant difference in the survival rates of farms that did not receive government payments in 
1987 and those that did receive payments.
9 
A  statistically  significant  difference  between  the  estimated  survival  functions  is  not 
strong  evidence  that  government  payments  influence  survival  because  other  factors  may  be 
correlated with both payments and survival.  For example, high-payment farms are larger on 
average, are more concentrated in certain types of farms and in certain regions, and are more 
likely to grow certain crops.  If these factors are correlated with both government payments and 
duration of farm survival, we may observe a relationship between payments and survival that is 
not causal.  To control for these factors we use the more general Cox proportional hazard model 
(Cox, 1972).  
The Cox model assumes a parametric form for the effect of the explanatory variables on 
survival,  but  allows  the  form  of  the  underlying  survivor  function  to  be  unspecified.    Cox’s 
semiparametric model has been widely used to explain firm survival (e.g., Mata et al, 1995; 
Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Disney et al, 2003).  The survival time of each member of the 
population is assumed to follow a hazard function given by: 
 
(1)    () ) ’ exp( 0 β i it x t h h = , 
 
where  ( ) t h0  is the baseline hazard function,  i x  is a vector of explanatory variables, and  β  is a 
vector of parameters.
10  To estimate  β , Cox (1972, 1975) proposed a partial likelihood function, 
                                                 
9 The Log-Rank test has a chi-square statistic of 4155.8 with an associated P-value less than 0.0001; the  Wilcoxon 
test has a chi-square of 4082.7 with an associated P-value less than 0.0001. 
10 The hazard function hit is the rate at which spells will be completed at duration t, given that they last until t.   10 
which eliminates the unknown baseline hazard function and accounts for the fact that survival 
times are censored.  
Explanatory variables include characteristics of the farm business and farm operator in 
the initial period, 1987.  Firm characteristics include business size (logarithm of total agricultural 
sales), indicator variables for the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of the farm, and an 
indicator  for  the  organizational  structure  of  the  farm  (family-owned  or  otherwise).  We  also 
experiment with fixed effects for the state in which the farm is located, for sales categories, and 
for sales categories interacted with the SIC code.  In terms of operator characteristics, we use 
indicators for ten operator age categories, for the operator’s race (white or otherwise), and the 
operator’s  main  occupation  (farming  or  otherwise).    Because  the  distribution  of  government 
payments (like sales) is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of government payments, 
and  set  the  value  to  zero  when  payments  equal  zero.
11    This  transformation  also  facilitates 
interpretation of the coefficient. 
Results reported in table 3 illustrate the stability of the estimates to changes in model 
specification.  In the first column, the effect of government payments on the hazard is estimated 
controlling for farm size, SIC category, and the age of the farm operator.  Consistent with other 
studies discussed above, we find that larger businesses are less likely to fail than smaller ones.  
As  many  farm  business  fail  when  the  operator  retires,  it  is  not  surprising  that  being 
younger than 70 years old (the missing category is 70 years or older) reduces the exit hazard, and 
that the magnitude of this reduction in the hazard shrinks  rapidly for  farmers 55 and older.  
Holding all else constant, operators 30-34 years old faced the smallest hazard, which increased 
                                                 
11 We also tried using government payments as a share of receipts (sales plus payments) which has the advantage of 
being bounded between zero and one. The main results obtained using this specification did not differ substantially 
from the results obtained using the logarithm of payments.   11 
gradually with age until farmers are 50-54 years old.  This result means we find no evidence to 
suggest that age is positively related to financial liquidity or to the acquisition of information in a 
way that enhances the likelihood of survival. 
Column 2 introduces additional controls for operator and farm business characteristics.  
Hazard rates are significantly lower on farms that are family-owned, or have an operator who is 
male or white.  The hazard rate is not significantly associated with the operator having farming 
as a primary occupation. 
Column 3 introduces 38 state fixed effects.  Column 4 includes fixed effects for the four 
sales categories and for the 24 sales-SIC interaction effects. These interaction indicators classify 
farms into one of four sales quartiles in one of the six SIC crop categories. The coefficient 
associated  with  the  logarithm  of  government  payments  is  statistically  very  significant  and 
consistent across the four model specifications. 
To interpret the payments coefficient, we can rewrite (1) as: 
 
(2)    () β ’ ln ln 0 i it x t h h + = . 
 
Let  g β  be the coefficient associated with the natural logarithm of government payments ( i g ln ), 
an element of  i x . It follows that: 
 
(3)    ( )( ) it i i it g h g dg dh = β . 
 
That is,  g β  is the responsiveness of the conditional probability of farm business failure to a 
change in government payments, expressed as an elasticity.   Hence, the full model (column 4)   12 
indicates that a 10% increase in government payments reduces the instantaneous rate of business 
failure by 0.43%.
12   
To estimate how the influence of farm payments on farm survival varies with farm size, 
the full model is estimated separately for six farm-size categories.  The results presented in table 
4 indicate that the effect of payments increases proportionally with farm size up to the top size 
quartile. A 10% increase in the government payments reduces the instantaneous rate of farm 
failure by 0.23%, 0.44%, 0.64%, and 0.91% for farms in the smallest to largest sales quartiles, 
respectively.    This  relationship  between  scale  and  effect  size  is  expected  as  farm  income 
represents  a  larger  share  of  total  farm  household  income  for  larger  farms.    However,  the 
magnitude  of  the  effect  of  payments  does  not  seem  to  increase  beyond  the  75
th  farm-size 
percentile: A 10% increase in payments reduces the hazard by 0.91%, 0.92%, and 0.88% for the 
largest 25%, 10% and 5% of farms, respectively. 
A large reduction in government payments could have substantially different implications 
for  farms  of  different  sizes.    Table  5  illustrates  the  effect  of  a  50%  reduction  in  direct 
government payments on expected life spans.
13   The effect of the payment reduction is shown 
separately  for  payment  recipients  and  for  all  farms.    Larger  operations  experience  a  greater 
reduction in life duration for two reasons.  First, the marginal effect of a reduction in payments is 
greater for larger operations.  Second, a greater percentage of large farms receive government 
payments (97.0% for the largest quartile, compared to 50.1% for the smallest quartile).  The table 
                                                 
12 In theory, farmers could respond to realized or expected government payments. Realized payments provide a 
noisy estimate of expected payments because a large component of expected payments are transitory. Consequently 
if farmers respond to expected payments, our estimated coefficient likely underestimates the effect of a change in 
expected payments. 
13 Government payments have fluctuated by 50% or more in consecutive years.  For example, total direct payments 
fell  from  $20.7  billion  in  2001  to  $10.9  billion  in  2002,  and  rose  again  to  $17.4  billion  in  2003. 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/finfidmu.htm)   13 
shows that a 50% drop in direct government payments shortens the expected life of the largest 
farms by 5.6% from 14.66 to 13.84 years, and shortens the expected life of the smallest farms by 
0.6% from 7.41 to 7.37 years.  
 
V. Conclusions 
The study found that government payments have a small but statistically significant positive 
effect on farm business survival.  This finding could be explained by several factors.  Farms 
receiving  relatively  high  payments  may  be  able  to  bid  up  the  price  of  land  and  other  fixed 
resources – causing farms receiving lower payments to exit. Government payments may also 
relieve liquidity constraints allowing farms receiving more payments to achieve a more efficient 
scale and remain in business longer. Additionally, higher payments may make farming more 
profitable relative to alternative occupations, thereby reducing incentives to exit agriculture. 
The  study  also  found  that  government  payments  increase  business  survival  rates 
proportionally  more  for  larger  farms.    This  result  is  probably  attributable  to  the  fact  that 
government  payments’  share  of  farm  household  income  increases  with  total  sales.    While 
payments appear to disproportionately benefit larger operations, the long run consequences of an 
increase in payments for agricultural structure are ambiguous.  Lower failure rates for larger 
farms do not necessarily imply an increase in the concentration of production. Further work 
would be needed to understand how government payments influence the size distribution of farm 
businesses.  
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Table 1. New Program Crop Farm (1982) Survival Rates over Time by Farm Type 
 
  1982  1987  1992  1997 
All program crop farms  140,876  70,478  45,122  31,630 
    (50.0)  (32.0)  (22.5) 
Wheat (SIC=111)  20,592  10,534  6,678  4,697 
    (51.2)  (32.4)  (22.8) 
Rice (SIC=112)  1,750  864  525  330 
    (49.4)  (30.0)  (18.9) 
Corn (SIC=115)  46,150  23,091  14,876  10,363 
    (50.0)  (32.2)  (22.5) 
Soybean (SIC=116)  34,875  15,398  9,311  6,392 
    (44.2)  (26.7)  (18.3) 
Cash Grain (SIC=119)  32,643  18,330  12,396  8,927 
    (56.2)  (38.0)  (27.3) 
Cotton (SIC=131)  4,866  2,261  1,336  921 
    (46.5)  (27.5)  (18.9) 
 
Notes:  The survival rate (in parentheses) is defined as the number farms surviving in a given 
period, as a percentage of the total number of new program crop farms established in 1982. 
 
   18 
Table 2. The Average Farm Business Spell by Sales and Government Payments as a Share of 
Sales 
 
Sales Quantiles  Government Payments as a Share of Sales (θ ) - Quartiles 
  0-25% 
(θ <0.09) 
25-50% 
(0.09≤ θ <0.20) 
50-75% 
(0.20≤ θ <0.34) 
75-100% 
(θ ≥0.34) 
         
0-25% (Sales < $10,963)         
Years  22.61  23.08  23.55  24.73 
(Std. Err.)  (0.080)  (0.181)  (0.172)  (0.124) 
Obs.  34,052  6,975  7,639  15,202 
25-50% ($10,963 ≤ Sales < $32,868)       
Years  24.81  25.11  26.59  28.04 
(Std. Err.)  (0.118)  (0.125)  (0.122)  (0.111) 
Obs.  15,463  14,564  15,039  18,803 
50-75% ($32,868 ≤Sales < $84,268)       
Years  24.86  26.78  28.37  28.51 
(Std. Err.)  (0.154)  (0.102)  (0.099)  (0.102) 
Obs.  8,214  18,290  19,198  18,168 
75-100% (Sales ≥ $84,268)         
Years  24.57  27.13  28.18  28.19 
(Std. Err.)  (0.156)  (0.077)  (0.083)  (0.118) 
Obs.  6,141  24,039  21,994  11,696 
90-100% (Sales ≥ $161,500)       
Years  25.02  27.52  28.14  28.54 
(Std. Err.)  (0.236)  (0.110)  (0.129)  (0.240) 
Obs.  2,652  11,404  8,809  2,687 
95-100% (Sales > $228,940)       
Years  25.20  27.75  28.10  28.64 
(Std. Err.)  (0.319)  (0.147)  (0.197)  (0.430) 
Obs.  1,507  6,508  3,838  924 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier Estimated Survival Functions for Farms in the Upper and Lower 
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Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of Farm Business Duration under Various Specifications 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err. 
                       
Log Sales  -0.065  0.003    -0.089  0.003    -0.096  0.003    -0.062  0.006 
SIC 111 (Wheat)  -0.255  0.013    -0.259  0.013    -0.211  0.016    -0.210  0.027 
SIC 112  (Rice)  0.144  0.023    0.128  0.023    0.013  0.025    -0.012  0.033 
SIC 115 (Corn)  -0.182  0.011    -0.175  0.011    -0.145  0.015    -0.184  0.021 
SIC 116  (Soybean)  -0.199  0.011    -0.188  0.012    -0.155  0.015    -0.187  0.022 
SIC 119 (Cash Grain)  -0.360  0.011    -0.346  0.011    -0.314  0.014    -0.306  0.020 
Operator’s Age <30  -0.766  0.014    -0.665  0.014    -0.660  0.014    -0.655  0.014 
Operator’s Age 30-34  -0.803  0.014    -0.710  0.014    -0.706  0.014    -0.696  0.014 
Operator’s Age 35-39  -0.772  0.013    -0.691  0.014    -0.689  0.014    -0.677  0.014 
Operator’s Age 40-44  -0.725  0.013    -0.652  0.013    -0.649  0.013    -0.637  0.013 
Operator’s Age 45-49  -0.699  0.013    -0.634  0.013    -0.633  0.013    -0.622  0.013 
Operator’s Age 50-54  -0.622  0.012    -0.567  0.013    -0.568  0.013    -0.557  0.013 
Operator’s Age 55-59  -0.392  0.011    -0.347  0.011    -0.347  0.011    -0.340  0.011 
Operator’s Age 60-64  -0.183  0.010    -0.147  0.011    -0.145  0.011    -0.141  0.011 
Operator’s Age 65-69  -0.192  0.011    -0.170  0.011    -0.168  0.011    -0.168  0.011 
Sex = Male  -      -0.255  0.014    -0.256  0.014    -0.258  0.014 
Race = White  -      -0.139  0.026    -0.076  0.027    -0.083  0.027 
Organiz. = Family Owned  -      -0.389  0.007    -0.386  0.007    -0.390  0.007 
Main Occupation = Farmer  -      0.011  0.007    0.002  0.007    0.006  0.007 
Sales Quartile 0-25  -      -      -      0.153  0.038 
Sales Quartile 25-50  -      -      -      0.118  0.031 
Sales Quartile 50-75  -      -      -      0.091  0.027 
State Fixed Effects  -      -      yes      yes   
Sales Quartile*SIC   -      -      -      yes   
Log Govt. Payments  -0.043  0.001    -0.041  0.001    -0.043  0.001    -0.043  0.001 
                       
Log-likelihood  -1619480      -1617837      -1617220      -1617073   
Chi-Sq (P-value)  21148.19  (<.0001)    24434.52  (<.0001)    25668.18  (<.0001)    25961.8  (<.0001) 
Obs.  255,477      255,477      255,477      255,477   
                       
Note:  Chi-Sq is the statistic associated with the test of the global null hypothesis that β =0.  
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Table 4. Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of Farm Business Duration by Farm Size Quantile 
 
          Total  Sales Quantile         
  0-25%    25-50%    50-75%    75-100%    90-100%    95-100% 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err.    Coeff.  Std. Err. 
                                   
Log Sales  -0.088  0.008    -0.086  0.016    -0.101  0.020    -0.060  0.012    -0.017  0.023    0.039  0.033 
SIC 111 (Wheat)  -0.169  0.034    -0.257  0.034    -0.207  0.036    -0.203  0.033    -0.188  0.052    -0.117  0.072 
SIC 112  (Rice)  -0.036  0.087    -0.018  0.068    0.084  0.048    0.028  0.035    -0.009  0.050    0.045  0.066 
SIC 115 (Corn)  -0.164  0.033    -0.129  0.033    -0.106  0.033    -0.074  0.027    -0.096  0.039    -0.117  0.053 
SIC 116  (Soybean)  -0.160  0.033    -0.129  0.032    -0.160  0.032    -0.135  0.027    -0.134  0.040    -0.115  0.054 
SIC 119 (Cash Grain)  -0.322  0.033    -0.330  0.032    -0.305  0.032    -0.227  0.025    -0.203  0.035    -0.190  0.046 
Operator’s Age <30  -0.450  0.024    -0.689  0.026    -0.799  0.033    -0.688  0.042    -0.648  0.072    -0.614  0.098 
Operator’s Age 30-34  -0.495  0.025    -0.650  0.026    -0.852  0.032    -0.777  0.040    -0.716  0.067    -0.650  0.089 
Operator’s Age 35-39  -0.485  0.024    -0.604  0.026    -0.796  0.031    -0.821  0.039    -0.774  0.065    -0.735  0.085 
Operator’s Age 40-44  -0.469  0.022    -0.574  0.025    -0.742  0.031    -0.814  0.039    -0.809  0.065    -0.786  0.085 
Operator’s Age 45-49  -0.455  0.022    -0.587  0.025    -0.756  0.031    -0.762  0.038    -0.710  0.063    -0.675  0.083 
Operator’s Age 50-54  -0.412  0.021    -0.560  0.024    -0.684  0.029    -0.657  0.037    -0.607  0.062    -0.579  0.081 
Operator’s Age 55-59  -0.342  0.020    -0.402  0.021    -0.374  0.026    -0.317  0.036    -0.290  0.060    -0.296  0.079 
Operator’s Age 60-64  -0.258  0.019    -0.209  0.019    -0.103  0.024    -0.043  0.035    -0.025  0.059    -0.060  0.078 
Operator’s Age 65-69  -0.185  0.018    -0.181  0.019    -0.180  0.026    -0.170  0.038    -0.110  0.064    -0.096  0.084 
Sex = Male  -0.207  0.020    -0.283  0.025    -0.369  0.034    -0.365  0.044    -0.362  0.074    -0.272  0.108 
Race = White  -0.104  0.035    -0.086  0.059    -0.155  0.078    -0.166  0.095    0.041  0.164    0.004  0.212 
Organiz. = Family Owned  -0.300  0.015    -0.344  0.014    -0.393  0.015    -0.433  0.013    -0.418  0.020    -0.383  0.027 
Main Occupation = Farmer  0.125  0.011    0.069  0.011    -0.066  0.015    -0.279  0.026    -0.361  0.049    -0.332  0.071 
State Fixed Effects  yes      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes   
Log Govt. Payments  -0.023  0.001    -0.044  0.002    -0.064  0.002    -0.091  0.002    -0.092  0.004    -0.088  0.005 
                                   
Log-likelihood  -425240      -372311      -323560      -280805      -100232      -47093   
Chi-Sq (P-value)  3028.5  (<.0001)    4415.0  (<.0001)    5241.0  (<.0001)    5527.2  (<.0001)    2395.7  (<.0001)    1258.7  (<.0001) 
Obs.  63,868      63,869      63,870      63,870      25,552      12,777   
                                   
 
Note: Chi-Sq is the statistic associated with the test of the global null hypothesis that β =0.   22 
Table 5. The Effect of a 50% Reduction in Government Payments on the Duration of Farm 
Businesses. 
 
Sales Quartiles  Estimated Life of Farm Business (Years) 
  Farms Receiving Payments    All Farms 
  Base  50% of  
Base 
% Change    Base  50% of  
Base 
% Change 
               
0-25%   7.98  7.88  -1.2    7.41  7.37  -0.6 
  (0.022)  (0.022)      (0.020)  (0.020)   
25-50%  9.79  9.53  -2.7    9.14  8.94  -2.2 
  (0.028)  (0.027)      (0.027)  (0.026)   
50-75%  12.30  11.76  -4.3    11.73  11.27  -4.0 
  (0.046)  (0.045)      (0.037)  (0.044)   
75-100%  15.09  14.23  -5.7    14.66  13.84  -5.6 
  (0.048)  (0.045)      (0.046)  (0.045)   
 
 
 
 